ABSTRACT
We frame the model and the laboratory CPR as non-cooperative games. These games have many Nash equilibria. We adopt as our refinement subgame perfection. When there are multiple subgame-perfect equilibria, we select among them using the principle of pay-off dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). We have two primary treatments, depending upon whether the safe zone consists of a single point or an interval. O ur primary results are that: ( 1) if the safe zone consists of a single point, the resource is rapidly destroyed in accordance with subgame-perfect equilibrium; (2 ) if the safe zone is an interval, group behaviour in some instances tends to focus on the best available equilibrium, but in general this equilibrium cannot be sustained and the resource is destroyed. These results show how valuable agreement among appropriators of a CPR can be, not only in capturing rents but also in saving the CPR from destruction.
