ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses claims about objective status into normative arguments about treatment. The claimant's normative position in Dothard and BLii asserts compulsory equal treatment on the basis of equal objective status. The claimant asserts that objective equality provides a sufficient condition for compulsory equal treatment: "If the objective status is equal, then the treatment should be equal." Legal rules, and arguments about them, are unthinkable without some derivation of values from facts: "The contract was breached, therefore Queen Mary should be compensated"; "John Rawls does possess a valid deed, therefore he should be entitled to occupy the land." There is no need to label it to indicate whether it is normative or factual, as it is always factual. One might appear to argue that treatment should be equal despite objective inequality. Members of a minority religious group might eagerly defend the proposition that their religion is different from others, and that they are, to that same extent, unequal.
