ABSTRACT
It is generally conceded that Kant was mistaken in many respects in The Critique of Pure Reason. To take three fundamental objections; first, the elements of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" ie. space and time were both misunderstood and far too rigid for the purpose of framing a priori knowledge; this was in part Hegel's objection. Kant was using them in a strict Euclidean sense, not even taking full account of the development of these concepts made by Newton nearly a century before. Second, the seminal distinction between analytic and synthetic statements has been seriously weakened as the result of critiques by Frege, Quine, and others. The distinction remains useful as a descriptive tool but is no longer viable a categorical logical distinction, which is what Kant's epistemology requires. Thirdly, the concept of" apperception" upon which he based the deduction of the twelve categories is at least unsatisfactory, if not incoherent, especially with respect to self-consciousness in that it would seem to presuppose a single, identical self with the power of representation.
