ABSTRACT
But free or intelligent substances ... in a kind of imitation of God .. . are not bound by any cerlain subordinate laws of the universe, but act as it were by a private miracle , on the sole initiative of their power, and by looking towards a final cause they interrupt the connection and course of the efficient causes that act on their will. .. . For just as the course of the universe is changed by the free will of God, so the course of the mind's thoughts is changed by its free will: so that, in the case of minds, no subordinate universal laws can be established (as is possible in the case of bodies) which are sufficient for predicting a mind's choice . ... From this it can be understood what is that 'indifference' which accompanies freedom.Just as contingency is opposed to metaphysical necessity, so indifference excludes not only metaphysical but also physical necessity. (C 20-21 [MP 100-101])
'See DM lili6, 7, 17 and LA :;6ff. ';See DM lili l/i, 17· 70r, more precisely, Freud could infer all future states of the iguana not involving the free
This will now help us to distinguish free substances froJl\ others (C ~() [MI' 100])
From this it can be understood what is that 'indifference' which accompanies freedom. Just as contingency is opposed to metaphysical necessity, so indifference excludes not only metaphysical but also physical necessity. (C 2 1 [MP 101])
2. PHYSICAL INDIFFERENCE AND COMPATIBILISM
What is this indifference we enjoy that stones and iguanas lack? Although the term docs various service for Leibniz in different works (and indeed in some of the same works), he is quite explicit about which sense he is llsing in NCT. A state of affairs is indifferent just in case it is not determined by "metaphysical or physical necessity ... [i.e. , it is not] a consequence demonstrable from the [finite] resolution of terms or from the laws of nature" (C 22 [MP 103]) . Like stones and iguanas, our existence and states are metaphysically contingent. Unlike stones and iguanas, some of our states are indifferent to the laws of nature, i.e., not physically necessary. How docs Leibniz characterize this latter modality? In DM § 16, Leibniz slates: . .. miracles and the acts of God's extraordinary concourse have this special feature : they cannot be foreseen by the reasoning of any created mind, however enlightened it may be, for the distinct comprehension of the general order surpasses all of them . On the other hand, all one calls "natural" depends on less general maxims, which crealllres can understand.
