ABSTRACT
In G. W. Leibniz's system, the issue of freedom occupies a prominent position. Moreover, since for him freedom does not only involve absence of external impediments, but also, among other things, the power to will as one should, it directly conflicts with weakness of will. This chapter discusses John Locke's position and Leibniz's reaction to it. It shows that Leibniz's critique of Locke is acute and his own views are bold, original and still capable of casting light on the issue. Leibniz's views about the different effects of dull and lively information on motivation, one may wonder whether the structure of his theory makes it more successful in dealing with some types of weakness of will than with others. In particular, Leibniz's therapeutic approach requires the practicing of virtues such as patience and constancy which, perhaps, the weak-willed agent has in a low degree.
