ABSTRACT
This chapter covers the Huk Rebellion which offers intra-case variation concerning government behavior and its ability to solve the identification problem. The Philippines Armed Forces (PAF) initially used risk-averse methods and indiscriminate violence. The Huk Rebellion offers intra-case variation on how government forces were transformed from risk-averse to risk-acceptant methods. The Huks and the PKP aimed to be the vanguard against state exploitation, but they wildly differed in how to do it. The years 1947 and 1948 saw more political maneuvering between the two politically opposed forces. The 1949 elections illustrate, the acute political challenges faced by the Filipino government. During the pre-reform era, the risk methods used by the government made it difficult to induce collaboration with civilians. The PAF was so adept at inducing militant identification that the Huk movement dissipated by 1954. In the post-reform era, Ramon Magsaysay reoriented the PAF's security force behavior.
