ABSTRACT
The propositional attitude by which Socrates explained his remaining in prison was a belief (doxa): the belief that to do so would be for the best. Aristotle ventured a correction. His generic term for such attitudes was 'orexis' which the medieval Aristotelians rendered into Latin as 'appetitus'. In revising the Oxford translation of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes has followed their example, rendering it as 'appetite'. The elements by which Aristotle held that human action is to be explained are therefore three: wishing for an end (boulesis); believing, as a result of deliberation, that a certain kind of action in one's power would effectively serve to bring about that end; and, as a result of these, choosing an action of that kind (prohairesis). All three, of course, are propositional attitudes: the first and third being orectic or appetitive, and the second cognitive. The behaviour of animals lacking intellect is caused by desires operating on what they sense and imagine.
