ABSTRACT

Mexico's semi-authoritarian political system has permeated policy-making and the state has traditionally dominated society regarding policy initiatives. The Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) electoral hegemony excluded the possibility of having a political organisation that effectively articulated demands from the unorganised segments of the society. According to Jeffry Frieden, large business groups derived their political influence mainly from their ability to organise into sectoral chambers mainly intended for lobbying, and from their potential to upset the economy by taking their capital out of the country. The relationship between the President and the bureaucracy is mediated by 'policy coalitions'. Sylvia Maxfield distinguishes two dominant policy coalitions in the Mexican political system: financial coalition and developmentalist coalition. Financing to the PRI became a critical issue in the context of stronger political opposition and elections scrutinised by an autonomous agency. The PRI's campaign financing for the 1994 presidential elections became closely associated to fraud allegations, especially in the newly privatised banking sector.