ABSTRACT
Explanation is an extraordinarily complicated topic. This chapter contrasts two types of explanations, theoretical and practical. It brings out the salient points relevant to freewill, even though there are many questions. The chapter starts with the distinction between knowledge based on classification and that based on ideal concepts or limit notions. It indicates how these various types of explanation are related to the problem of freewill. It also considers the explanations which an agent gives of why he did something, which is called practical explanations. The notion of a pro-attitude is to be grasped by seeing what a list of words have in common. Practical reason works in the realm of deciding what conduct is universalisable. The chapter reinforces the position that man should be seen as a partially rational creature. Conceptual determinism looks solely at theoretical reason. Its dichotomy of 'either caused or random' asserts that in this field only deductive explanation is logically complete.
