ABSTRACT
Corporate governance is a wide and in many ways disputed term and practice, but for the sake of simplicity, it is defined, following Aguilera and Jackson, as the relationships among stakeholders in the process of decision making and control over firm resources. Corporate governance decisions are subject to scholarly research within a series of disciplines including management studies, economics, legal studies, and economic sociology. Shareholder welfare governance has served to justify the extraction of economic value from firms at the expense of, for example, employees, thus tipping the power-balance in the favour of finance capital owners. The new shareholder welfare governance model, established over six decades of free-market advocacy, established the new doctrine that the corporate system would maximize its efficiency if, and only if, shareholder received the so-called residual cash flow. Managerial capitalism was by and large a heterogeneous framework of legislation, practices and conventional wisdom, serving to entangle the corporations and its regulatory control in various ways.
