ABSTRACT
According to the traditional distinction, particulars are those things of which other things can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of other things; universals are those things which can be predicated of other things and can also be the subjects of predication. Thus Socrates is a particular, because we can predicate various things of Socrates but cannot predicate Socrates of anything else, whereas wisdom is a universal because we can both say things of wisdom (e.g. that it is a characteristic rarely possessed by the young) and ascribe wisdom to other things (e.g. by saying that wisdom is a property of Socrates, or equivalently, just by saying that Socrates is wise). The acknowledgement of universals in this sense can seem inevitable. For if it is insisted, for example, that wisdom can only occur as predicate, not as subject, then in the very act of insisting on this, it seems, one makes wisdom a subject of predication.
