ABSTRACT
We have assumed that the Stoic compatibilist theory from DF 13 and N 35 is Chrysippean. The present chapter argues that there is no conclusive reason for thinking otherwise, and compares this theory to two other Chrysippean compatibilist theories. One of them, we have already examined in some detail. It is the theory from F 43 and NA 7.2.11, which was designed to refute the incompatibilist ‘externalist objection’: if the world were governed by determinism, everything we do would, in fact, be fully determined by external factors alone. The other theory, which modern scholars have also attributed to Chrysippus, has not been mentioned so far in this book. It states that, in spite of determinism, an individual action may be contingent in a sense that the agent may either perform it or not at a specific time. Implicit in this theory is the contention that, in some cases at least, determinism is compatible with the freedom to do otherwise which incompatibilists standardly regard as a condition sine qua non for responsibility but also as incompatible with determinism. In the course of this chapter I shall refer to these theories as T3, T1, and T2, respectively.
