ABSTRACT
As described by Imre Lakatos, a ‘research programme consists of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristic)’ (Lakatos, 1968, p. 132). Such rules are often left implicit. However, if stated, they may resemble very general claims about the world – claims that exceed any possible empirical confirmation.1 Lakatos says that such principles are made ‘“irrefutable” by the methodological decision of its protagonists’ (Lakatos, 1968, p. 133). However, strictly speaking, being rules and not empirical claims, they are neither true nor false and they are not subject to proof or refutation. Like any rules, they can be shown to be useful in achieving certain objectives (for example, in explaining and controlling nature) and, once seen as useful, they may become standard conventions (one might say made irrefutable) by the consensus of the researchers who adopt them.
