ABSTRACT
In his thoughtful and engaging essay, Luca Mocarelli gives primacy to an examination of discourse, but draws simultaneously on practice to make some of his points. One of them, albeit only tacitly intimated, strikes me as critically important in methodological terms: the indivisibility of discourse and practice at certain historical junctures, the necessity of scrutinizing them in dialogue or in tension, and the (anthropological?) temptation not to worry about the ontological priority of the one vis-à-vis the other. Two linked questions permeate Mocarelli’s reflections. First, do representations – one’s own or those of one’s other(s) – influence behaviour: I detest my work and/or myself because my work is (deemed) vile, and I perform it indifferently or badly; or, given the shame in which it engulfs me, I exercise rigour in its execution; or I contest this image of my work, which I recognize is geared to demean me and the price/worth of my labour, and I react subversively, to convey my message (a posture that can be taken by either a lowly porter or an upwardly mobile merchant). Second, does one’s behaviour affect the representations that one forges of oneself or that are fashioned by one’s other(s): my manifestly or subtly contentious behaviour elicits a view that I am dangerous; or my briskly competitive conduct in the market confirms the suspicion of my cupidity; or the dirt consubstantial to my task and to my miserable living conditions encourages the inference that I am morally shabby, functionally unreliable and socially unruly.
