ABSTRACT
One rarely meets Siai'peaig and |i£pia(iog linked together as they are here. Now compare the standard account of division below in the logical chapter ch. 5, p. 156.34-5 where the first type o f diaipeaig is said to be o f a genus into species and the second of a whole into parts (pipr)). The main differences between these two kinds o f division are o f course (a) that one can take away a species without destroying the genus, but cannot eliminate a part without destroying a whole, and (b) that though a species is (in a sense) a part o f its genus, a part is by no means always a species of its whole (standard example: hand is not a species o f man, and ‘man’ cannot be predicated o f ‘hand').4 Consequently the terms £i6r) and pipr) may be used interchangeably also when we are dealing with divisions of philosophy. According to Diogenes Laertius 7.39-40, for instance, the Stoics divided philoso phy5 into three parts (peprj), called t o t t o l , ‘locations’, by Apollodorus,6 e i '6 t) , ‘species’, by Chrysippus and Eudromus, and y£vr), ‘genera’, by others (no names given). The terms £t6r) and y e v t ) are o f course equivalent to a degree, because its relational position in a diaeretic stemma determines whether a term is viewed as a species or a genus: it is the genus of what is below and a species of what is above it. So when the three main parts of (the logos pertaining to) philosophy are called species they are considered in relation to their genus, i.e., philosophy, and when they are called genera they are considered in relation to their further subdivisions. When they are called pepr) the division is not primarily o f a genus into species (and sub-species) but
4 See my account of the various forms and applications of the diaeretic method at Heresiography in Context: H ippolytus ’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy. Philosophia Antiqua 56 (Leiden etc. 1992) 79ff. (on Alcinous and Clement), 326ff. (general overview), where evidence is cited both for the distinction between the division of genus into species and the whole into parts, and for the indiscriminate use of the terms ‘parts’ and ‘species’.
