ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces the insanity defence and examines Anglo-American criminal law's consideration of voluntarism in three major classes of incapacity that may excuse responsibility or mitigate punishment for a criminal act: intoxication, automatism, and insanity. It shows that the law considers meta-responsibility in the first two incapacitating conditions, but not in insanity. The illogicality and inconsistency of considering meta-responsibility in only two of the three incapacitating conditions is considered, as well as how such a state of affairs might have arisen. The insanity defence constitutes an ostensibly remarkable, albeit infrequent, act of altruism afforded to those who 'don't know any better' because of their mental disorder. The chapter shows that self-causation of the incapacity is considered to a greater or lesser degree in the intoxication and automatism, but not insanity. The role of emotion and mental disorder in interfering with both foresight and insight is of utmost importance to the self-causation of mental disorder.
