ABSTRACT
This chapter distinguishes clearly between directed duties and non-directed duties. As Thomson observes, while every directed duty attaches to two people—the agent who owes it and another to whom it is owed—the all things considered ought to only attaches to one person, the agent. This observation is what motivates Judith Thomson's hat terminology: the concept of a directed duty is, as she says, a "two-hat concept," whereas the concept of the all things considered (ATC) ought is a "one-hat concept". If one takes the unadorned term "duty" to be defined as the correlative of a claim-right, then one may view the assertion that duties of generosity are nondirected duties as a challenge to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's equivalence. Jeremy Waldron and, more explicitly, Wayne Sumner suggest that the will theory of rights and the interest theory of rights can each be read as accounts of the direction in a directed duty.
