ABSTRACT
A distinctive feature of contemporary liberal theory is its emphasis on "neutrality" -the view that the state should not reward or penalize particular conceptions of the good life but, rather, should provide a neutral framework within which different and potentially confticting conceptions of the good can be pursued. Liberal neutrality has been criticized from many angles, but I will be concerned here only with the connection critics draw between neutrality and individualism, particularly in the context of Rawls's theory of justice. One of the most persistent criticisms of Rawls's theory is that it is excessively individualistic, neglecting the way that individual values are formed in social contexts and pursued through communal attachments. I will distinguish three different ways that critics have attempted to connect neutrality and individualism and argue that all rest on misinterpretations of Rawls's theory. However, there are important aspects of the relationship between individual values and social contexts which Rawls does not discuss, and I ho pe to show that the dispute over liberal neutrality would be more fruitful ifboth sides moved away from general questions of "individualism" toward more specific questions about the relationship between state, society, and cuhure in liberal democracies.
