ABSTRACT
In Chapter 8, I discussed tendencies among the friends of religion to say more than they know when advocating religious belief. In their apologetic appeals, they make claims about the respective states of the souls of believers and non-believers which cannot be sustained if attention is given to them with a non-apologetic eye. This tendency can be detected in the philosophical friends of religion I discussed in the first six chapters, as when, for example, they claim that morality is logically dependent on religious belief, or think that recognizing the heterogeneity of morals entails relativism. In the previous chapter, however, it was not friends such as these that I discussed, but, rather, others to whom I have a greater philosophical affinity, and from whom I have learned much. My reason for doing so was to show how deep the tendency to say more than we know is in religious apologetics. We distort the raggedness of life to obtain an apologetic tidiness. In the present chapter that theme is continued, albeit in a different, though related, direction.
