ABSTRACT
Situational crime prevention has been defined as comprising ‘opportunityreducing measures that are (1) directed at highly specific forms of crime (2) that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible (3) so as to increase the effort and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as perceived by a wide range of offenders’ (Clarke, 1992: 4). Since its inception, one of situational prevention’s most important goals ‘has been to provide a scien tific framework for some practical and common sense thinking about how to deal with crime’ (Clarke, 1995: 93). However, in spite of its many practical achievements, it has not been broadly accepted by academics and policy makers (Clarke, 1992: passim), particularly in the United States. There is, however, some indication that the approach is beginning to be
taken seriously. There is a growing body of scientific research on many aspects of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1992, 1995; Clarke and Felson, 1993). Situational crime prevention is now part of established crime control policies in several European countries, including Britain, Holland and Sweden. While such ‘official’ acceptance is perhaps a happy sign for the promoters of this perspective, it also means that the approach will inevitably face new political, ideological and scientific challenges. The academic and ideological vulnerability of situational crime preven
tion is quite obvious. Situational crime prevention is an approach that uses scientific methods, sometimes appearing as a scientific theory, in order to pursue a distinct and unambiguous value: the prevention of crime. It is very different from traditional theories of crime causation in 20th-century
criminology which, in their effort to claim the respectability of science, stay clear of taking an explicit position on crime prevention or control (though it may well be argued that many, if not all, contain such hidden assumptions).1 Some of the prevention techniques employed by situational crime preven
tion specialists have already provoked familiar criticisms. The use of televi sion cameras for surveillance, for example, has raised the spectre of ‘Big Brother’, with reference to the ‘panoptic society’ described with such nega tive bias by Foucault (1979). Situational crime prevention applies science and uses its energies in such a goal oriented, purposeful way that it creates the impression of a utilitarian theory. But is it a utilitarian theory, or just a commonsense technique? And what is a utilitarian theory? In this chapter we explore the theoretical and philosophical roots of utilitarianism as it may inform the content of situational crime prevention theory. To accomplish this task, it is first necessary to describe the recent history of situational crime prevention theory, so that the relevant elements of that theory may be addressed.
