ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with ways in which some of the special features of selfknowledge relate to somewhat less familiar problems in the moral psychology of the first-person. The discussion is framed, in part, by an examination of Wittgenstein's remarks on Moore's Paradox, and I want to draw from these remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy me here is their shared hostility to the idea of theoretical certainty as our model for the authority of ordinary selfknowledge, and their relating of such a theoretical model to specific forms of selfalienation. This, in turn, is related to another concern they share, a concern with the difficulties, philosophical and otherwise, in conceiving of oneself as but one person in the world among others. They share the sense, I believe, that while I recognize that I am a finite empirical being like anyone else, I must also recognize that the inescapable peculiarities of the first-person point of view oblige me to think of myself as both something more and something less than another empirical human being. The aim of this paper, however, is not to draw parallels between these two philosophers, but to develop the outlines of an argument concerning self-knowledge, one which relocates some of its special features nearer to moral psychology than epistemology. But I find I need to draw on both writers to do so.
