ABSTRACT
Muchrecentworkinthemetaphysicsandepistemologyofself-awarenesshas concerneditselfwithwhathascometobeknownastheelusivenessthesis(see,for example,Shoemaker,1986,1994;Cassam,1994,1997;Bermudezetal.,1995; Bermudez,1998;Peacocke,1999).Accordingtotheelusivenessthesis,theselfcannot beanobjectofintrospectiveawareness,withthisgeneralideadevelopedindifferent waysdependinguponhowthekeynotionsofselfandintrospectionareunderstood. Alternativelyput,whenwefindoutaboutourownpropertiesthroughintrospection wearenotacquaintedwithanyobjectwhosepropertiestheyare.Inthisrespect,then, ourintrospectiveawarenessofourselvesisfundamentallydifferentfromourawareness ofordinaryphysicalobjectsandotherpsychologicalsubjects.
