ABSTRACT
Descartes argued for the 'real distinction' between mind and body as follows. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without (my) body; God can bring about whatever I can clearly and distinctly conceive; so my mind can exist without my body. Arnauld alleged that this argument was flawed, for the meditator's grasp of his own mind may not be 'complete and adequate' (Arnauld, 164111984: 141, AT 201) He gave the following case of defective reasoning that, he claimed, was analogous to Descartes' reasoning:
The dispute between Descartes and Arnauld centers on the issue of whether introspective data provide suitable support for ontological conclusions. Descartes' argument uses the meditator's introspective grasp of her own mental goings-on to establish a conclusion about the ontology of the mental. My goal in this paper is to determine what would be required to successfully defend this sort of inference. I will focus on the question whether a subject can be warranted in believing that her introspective grasp of a mental state is comprehensive, in the sense required to avoid the mistake Arnauld describes.
