ABSTRACT
To what kind of preferences can the information requirement be applied? We have seen that it can be applied to instrumental preferences, but can it be applied to other preferences as well?1
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Let us reconsider the example about my preference to be a tragic philosopher à la Wittgenstein. We have first to decide what I really want in this situation: what is the proper object of my preference? This question can be notoriously difficult to answer, even when we consider our own preferences. Do I want to be a reluctant philosopher in order to be like Wittgenstein, or has Wittgenstein inspired me to be a reluctant philosopher? How do I know what comes first in my attitude towards this way of living – does Wittgenstein inspire because of the strange and in a way tragic life he led, or am I inspired to do the same things and lead the same strange life as he did because of some independent property of the person Wittgenstein?
