ABSTRACT

In seeking additional fortresses for the Estado da Índia, the Portuguese had utilized the time-honored, predictable, albeit generally efficient ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ strategy. Vasco da Gama had of course exploited this move on the Swahili coast of Africa in 1498 and 1502 exploiting friction between the Kilwa, Melindi, and Mombasa. Pedro Álvares Cabral, Afonso de Albuquerque, and Francisco de Almeida had also employed this strategy on the Malabar coast courting Unni Goda Varma, the ruler of Cochin, in opposition to the ‘unreasonable’ posturing of the Zamorin (Samudri) of Calicut. For their trouble, the Portuguese had been rewarded with coastal settlements and fortresses at Cochin, Cannanore, and Cranganor by 1522. By that time, the Portuguese had already made several attempts to obtain a settlement and fort at perhaps the most important port on the Gulf of Cambay: Diu. In fact, they had been encouraged in this desire by the Sultan Muzaffer Shah II (1511-26)

who sent an envoy to Goa in 1512 in an effort to halt Portuguese attacks on his lucrative trade and shipping. Yet, the shrewd Governor of Diu, Malik Ayaz, who had a strong vested interest in depriving the Estado of this prized possession had resisted the efforts of Francisco de Almeida (1509), Afonso de Albuquerque (1513), and Diogo Lopes de Sequeira (1521).3