ABSTRACT
Our purpose in this paper is to evaluate a conception of evolution in general, and the units of selection in particular, that have been articulated by a group that we shall refer to as Developmental Systems Theorists. 1 So we first outline
their distinctive "take" on evolution and the units of selection, and contrast it with three other perspectives. We then compare and contrast our views of genes and replicators with that of Developmental Systems Theory. In resisting their view that genes play no distinctive informational role in inheritance, it becomes clear that though the genes playa very special role in development, they are not alone in playing this role. We argue that despite its insights Developmental Systems Theory has serious problems. Moreover, its insights can be captured by a less radical take on the units of selection problem. We think that Dawkins (1982) and Hull (1981, 1988) were right to distinguish between replication and interaction, but we think they underestimate the range of biological replication. Finally, we speculate on that extended range, and suggest that there are good reasons for thinking that Bateson's famous reductio of the replicator is no reductio at all.
