ABSTRACT
Theories of autonomy as psychological authenticity in effect assimilate autonomy with respect to one’s preferences, values, or choices with the autonomy of persons, as if what can be predicated of the former can be predicated of the latter. This assimilation signals the need for an alternate account of self-government. The problem is not merely that such theories lack an adequate analysis of the condition of personal autonomy in terms of something other than the authenticity of psychological states. Rather, they contend that the autonomy of persons is a matter of the condition of a person’s psychology-specifically, a person’s pro-attitudes (or lack of negative affect) toward her desires, values, commitments and so forth, coupled with dispositional capabilities-and they seek no other account. But while a person’s status as self-governing is in part dependent on her psychology, personal autonomy and autonomy vis à vis one’s psychological states differ in kind; since the subjects vary, the conditions for each may vary as well.
