ABSTRACT
Security studies analysis of prospects for war, peace, and the relative balance of power among states naturally gravitates toward two primary components: assessments of capabilities and intentions. While analysis of a state’s capabilities turns on a comprehensive analysis of a state’s war-fighting capacity, forces, order of battle, ability to use technology, organizational structures, and ability to effectively implement integrated command, control, communication, and computer capabilities, the analysis of state intentions and leadership motivations tends to be more qualitative, revolving around assessments of psychology, perceptions of its own situation and the intent of its enemies, strategic dilemmas, signaling, and so on. The empirical advantages of focusing on capability are obvious, but such assessments can be foiled by lack of transparency or efforts by a state to engage in strategic deception, either as a means by which to magnify external perceptions of its own capabilities in order to avoid potential attack, or to hide capabilities from others so as to gain tactical or strategic advantage in the event of conflict. Problems in assessing capabilities are therefore inexorably tied to the analysis of intent, since attempts to hide capability or lack thereof are symptoms of a troubling absence of transparency which cannot be addressed without considering intent. But the data set for assessing intent is by its nature incomplete. Public statements that might indicate intentions cannot necessarily be taken at face value since such statements could constitute a conscious effort to mislead or obscure true motivations, while non-public motivations are by their nature concealed from public scrutiny.
