ABSTRACT
There is a popular tendency among observers of international institutions, particularly those focussed on or closely associated with the United Nations, to reject a role for the G8 in governing the global security system (Kuhne and Prantl 2000; Luck 2000; Keating 2000; Felix-Paganon 2000; Hide 2000).1 In this 'rejectionist' view, the G8 is not a real body, as it lacks a formal founding charter and has no political and geographic balance in its membership, and thus reflects world realities far less than the longestablished, legally legitimised, and bureaucratically grounded United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Moreover, the G8 is not viewed as a body that is ready or willing to intervene in response to difficult security problems in many parts of the world, such as the Great Lakes region of Africa, where the UN has also proven reluctant to become involved. Thus any attempts by the international community or its leading members to endow the G8 with a robust security role would dangerously divert the attention and the resources of the major members governments that belong to both the G8 and the UN away from the United Nations where their intellectual, material, and financial investments are urgently needed. In short, the G8 is not, and should not be, a substitute for the UN in the security field.
