ABSTRACT
Aristotle’s introduction to his De anima begins with a tangle of reections on his subject matter, the soul (ψυ) or ‘principle of the living body’ (ρ τ upsilontilde ντ ς σµατ ς), upon the proper scientic approach to that material, and upon scientic methodology more generally. Having described this investigation (στ ραν) as one of the noblest and nest on account of its high degree of scientic precision and the superior and wondrous nature of its subject matter, Aristotle proceeds to raise a series of questions which seem to undercut the feasibility of such a scientic investigation. () He begins by announcing uncertainty about what method is appropriate to the determination of the essence ( upsilonlenisσα) or the what-it-is (τ τ στι) of something – if indeed there is a single correct method; here he seems to be raising a general methodological question. () He then announces perplexity about the proper ‘starting points’ (ρα) for his inquiry; this seems to be a question prompted by special characteristics of the soul as subject matter. en, perhaps as separate questions, he asks () what genus the soul falls under, and () whether it is actuality or potentiality. He then moves on to a dense set of interconnected questions:
* Research for this paper was supported partially by a Manship grant from the College of Arts & Sciences at Louisiana State University, and partially by an A.C. Mellon Grant from the Vatican Film Library at St. Louis University; the Vatican Film Library also generously put all of
Aristotle goes on to raise further questions. If the soul has parts, how are these related to each other; and how are they ultimately to be identied: by their operations, or perhaps by the respective proper objects of the operations? Abruptly, he observes that knowing the accidents (συµ+ε+ηκ!τα) of a thing may greatly contribute to knowing what it is essentially (τ τ στι), as well as the other way around.en, having rst observed that the passions of the soul seemmostly not to belong exclusively to the soul, but more properly to what is ensouled, Aristotle asks whether there are any passions or activities of the soul which are proper to it alone – if, for example, thinking is done by the soul alone: if so, he says, the soul will be separable from the body. e passions, he points out, seem not to be independent of body in this way; they are ‘enmattered accounts’ (λ!γ ι *νυλ ). He is thus prompted to ask whether the soul is more appropriately studied from the perspective of the natural philosopher or that of the dialectician – or by some combination of both. Aer a lengthy discussion of this question, Aristotle returns to a discussion of the passions of the soul; we must repeat, he says, that they are inseparable from the underlying matter of animal life.
