ABSTRACT
The debate about the importance of efficiencies in the competitive analysis of mergers is not new, nor is it recent. It is, however, a particularly timely issue. Indeed, the wave of transnational mergers that has been observed since the mid-1990s has progressively brought into the spotlight, especially in the aftermath of the GE/Honeywell case, the differences between the systems ofand the standards for - merger review among various jurisdictions, in particular the United States of America and the European Union. One of the major differences that commentators have pointed out as a source of concern and a possible explanation for the dissenting reviews by competition authorities of the same operation, is the treatment of the so-called "efficiencies". Although the primary goal of merger control is to accommodate the impact on competition of potentially harmful large-scale mergers, the concern expressed by the business community and some regulators relates to the hidden costs associated with the prohibition of operations that could otherwise increase the overall economic welfare of society through the achievement of significant efficiency gains (so-called "Type II" errors).
