ABSTRACT
Richard Campsall uses a range of singular terms, including ones like 'pale Socrates' that juxtapose a proper name with a denominative term. By contrast with possibility-propositions de esse, possibility-propositions de non esse do not, according to Campsall, imply the corresponding assertorics. Campsall holds that universal negative apodeictics have two senses – compound and divided. Campsall appears to be distinguishing three aspects of necessity, namely: – unconditionality, invariance, and inseparability. Campsall does not follow Robert Kilwardby's usage according to which an assertoric that is in fact necessary counts as simpliciter. Thus, Campsall's truth-conditions for affirmative necessity-propositions appear to be the same as for the class of propositions that are either simpliciter or ut nunc in the first way. In Campsall's logic, the problem disappears because for him there is no semantic difference between an affirmative possibility-proposition and the corresponding assertoric. Thus, it is always legitimate to replace an affirmative possibility-proposition by the corresponding assertoric.
