ABSTRACT
The US debate derived partially from the rapid surge and diversification of UN peacekeeping towards the end of, and immediately after, the Cold War. From 1 948 to 1 978 the United Nations established only thirteen peacekeeping and observer missions, with the United States assigning military observers in Palestine ( 1 948) and in Lebanon ( 1 978). Having paid some 30 per cent of the assessed and voluntary budgets for UN operations, the US provided airlift, logistic support and other equipment, often without charge. 4 However, from May 1 988 to October 1 993 the UN created twenty new forces, and, by early 1 994, seventeen forces (five of which pre-dated 1 979) functioned, involving 70,000 troops, observers and civilian police. Nor were these simply inter-positional forces separating former belligerents; UN forces now monitored (and in some cases organised) elections,
the Golan Heights for twenty years, in Cyprus for forty years, and in Kashmir for fifty years. John Hillens, an adviser to the Bush campaign during the 2000 presidential election, argued that 'The U.S. should not be interested in make-work military options in which a "draw'' is a good result.' 14 The American predilection for seeking swift military outcomes seemed at odds with the UN penchant for negotiation and seeking consensus (both locally and in UN headquarters). 15
Sceptics advocated a much-reduced US involvement in multinational peace operations, with the US providing intelligence, transport, logistics and support while other nations provided the bulk of the ground forces. 16 Hillens insisted that 'Superpowers don't do windows', arguing that the US should maintain its unique military capabilities:
In fact, the presidencies of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton were willing to do "windows', committing US forces to peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. These were contentious decisions after the US debacles in the Vietnam War and Lebanon ( 1982-3) . Nor did the missions conform to the guidelines on US military intervention drawn up by former US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in 1984, and later amplified by Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Compared with the guidelines, US vital interests were hardly threatened in any of these cases, the political and military objectives were not precisely defined, and the 'reasonable assurance' that the interventions had the support of the American people and Congress was questionable. 18
observed, ·my problem with the UN is that Boutros Boutros-Ghali doesn't pass the test we laid out on July 4, 1 776. '27 Summers accepted that the US had ceded 'operational control' of some us forces to foreign officers, but this only involved a temporary authority to organise forces and employ them in specific missions. Under PDD 25, a foreign commander with operational control over US forces could not separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or alter internal discipline. The l 04th Congress tried to underpin this directive by prohibiting or limiting US troops from serving under UN command but these efforts incurred a presidential veto. The rulings of court-martial and appeal courts in connection with US Army Specialist, Michael G. New ( 1996-9) also established that American soldiers could not refuse to wear the UN patch and blue beret when serving on UN missions.28
