ABSTRACT
The central notion of libertarian theory is 'property'. Property is a kind of right. Exactly what kind of a right it is, is a notoriously difficult question to answer satisfactorily. The term 'property' is ambiguous and has defied numerous attempts to define it. Nevertheless some such attempt at a definition is necessary if libertarian political morality is to make any sense at all. This chapter examines and challenges a formulation attributed to by which an impediment to freedom can only be the non-rightful action of another. It discusses the issues are controversial also among libertarians and not only within a wider forum. The chapter evaluates and rejects Narveson's position by which only active interference, and not non-assistance, can restrict freedom. It presents a list of eleven incidents which together constitute the notion of full liberal ownership. The chapter shows that it is primarily consensual transfer that is normatively implied by property and not mere conceptual transferability.
