ABSTRACT
There can be identified amongst some contemporary legal theorists, a neotraditionalist movement, amongst the principal facets of which is a willingness to tolerate a pre-modem idea of Taw’ as art. As Posner expresses it, for some within the neotraditionalist movement, Taw is an art - the art o f social governance by rules’ (1990: 435). The explanation of law this present work seeks to describe shares some similarities in belief with this emerging neotraditionalist movement, although there is much which distinguishes the two. As I have said, legal theory addresses the primary ontological question in legal philosophy: What kind of entity - if anything - is Taw’? It is this question that I now seek to answer in Part II, by providing what I consider to be the best available explanation as to what kind of entity law is best conceived to be, coherent with the SRH, SRVH, ATH, IMH and AVH developed in Part I.
