ABSTRACT
The traditional empirical theory of meaning has two main components: the reductionist account of meaning and the 'double-language' model of scientific theory. Thomas Kuhn introduced a new bearer of incommensurability that is the lexicons /lexical structures of scientific languages. Critics argue that Kuhn's and P. Feyerabend's thesis of incommensurability based on their contextual theories of meaning faces many difficulties. Incommensurability becomes a sort of untranslatability, localized to one or another area in which two lexical taxonomies differ. After 1983, by virtue of introducing the new tool of lexicon and its structure, Kuhn continues to rely heavily on the notion of untranslatability in his explication of incommensurability, and further links untranslatability closely with change of the taxonomic structures of scientific languages. The notion of untranslatability leads to the dissolution of the issue of incommensurability. This line of reasoning makes it too easy for the opponents of incommensurability to claim a victory.
