ABSTRACT
Divine eternity is under re and is subject to a lot of questions. Not only so-called Openeists vote for some sort of divine temporalism. It has become almost a commonopinion among contemporary Systematiceologians that the classic idea of divine atemporality has to be replaced by some sort of temporalism. Contemporary philosophy shows, nevertheless, that the discussion is extremely overheated; the gaps between the dišerent camps are deep. And the mutual accusations are harsh. Even the more or less “indecisive” thinkers reveal that it is not easy to give up the classic idea of eternity and that it is, on the other hand, equally problematic not to listen to some subtle arguments provided by so-called temporalists. So, why should one even try to argue in favour of classic eternalism? Before I develop some thoughts in order to introduce one (and, actually, it is just one) intuition that somehow forced me not to stay indecisive but to vote for divine eternity let me briežy dene what I mean by divine eternity (but, as one can see, this denition is just a summary of what has been outlined by eternalists anyway): 1. An eternal being is not just an everlasting entity. It is, literally, not subject to
the žow of time.erefore: 2. An eternal being has no temporal parts. And: 3. An eternal being is ‘simultaneous’ to any points t1 and t2 in time even if t1
and t2 are not simultaneous.1 4. An eternal being is, based on this notion of simultaneity, fully present (omni-
present) to and at every point in time.
