ABSTRACT

So far I have in general terms, and as applied to make-believe play, shown that some commonly held views about reference and reality are problematic. Another area conceptualized predominantly with weak dependence on physical characteristics, religion, with its linguistic practices, will now be subjected to the same kind of analysis of reference and reality. Our capacity for make-believe activities and our capacity for making and using conceptualizations that are weakly dependent on physical characteristics is the point of contact between make-believe play and religious activities. No other systematic comparison between make-believe play and religion is intended, although I do mention some phenomenological similarities in order to illustrate some points I make. The reader is also reminded that this work is not intended to constitute an argument against religious realism, but the intention is simply to investigate how religion fares without it. How can the reference of “God” in religious activities best be understood without appealing to a metaphysically existing God believed to exist quite independently of our conceptualizations?