ABSTRACT

My aims have been to show the need for an alternative way of looking at reference and reality in general and to God in particular that will unsettle the dichotomization characteristic of the realist and non-realist debates within philosophy of religion; and to indicate what such an alternative might look like. In a dualistic manner, the general view of reference that underlies many of the discussions in the realist and non-realist debates of today presupposes that objects either exist or do not exist, and that only that which exists can be referred to. Such a view is problematic for anyone wanting to reject religious realism and at the same time wanting to promote the continuation of a religious practice that involves referring to God. Religious non­ realism holds that “God” should not be understood as referring to a metaphysical God existing independently of our conceptualizations. There are then seemingly only two alternatives left for the religious non-realist for how to understand the reference of “God” . The referring practice involving “God” can be interpreted as not referring to anything real, in line with talk about other non-existing fictional characters such as Anna Karenina or Sherlock Holmes. Engaging in religious practice is then like being inspired by great literature, or being carried away by compelling myths. The other alternative is to interpret religious language use as indeed referring to something, although not God, but, for instance, emotions, an internalized father figure, neural transmissions, or sociological values.