ABSTRACT
Realism versus non-realism in the interpretation of science thus relates to broad hermeneutical questions concerning the character of scientific thought, discourse, practice and institutions. It follows that there are two ways in which a non-realist hermeneutic of science can be argued for. One way is to deny the asymmetry thesis outlined. The other way of arguing for a non-realist hermeneutic of science is to deny that science exhibits clear marks of accumulation of truth and discoveries. This chapter contends that the asymmetry thesis holds. It highlights the fact that theology does not show any accumulation of truth and discovery in the manner of science and then draws the obvious moral that it deserves a non-realist hermeneutic. The hermeneutical sciences are productive of understanding. This understanding is vital to the living of an examined life. The chapter concedes the point that philosophy is not a realist discipline for the sake of argument.
