ABSTRACT
Section 1 From very early days down to the present time the essential nature of trusts and other equitable interests has formed a favourite subject for analysis and disputation. The classical discussions of Bacon1 and Coke are familiar to all students of equity, and the famous definition of the great chief justice (however inadequate it may really be) is quoted even in the latest text-books on trusts.2 That the subject has had a peculiar fascination for modem legal thinkers is abundantly evidenced by the well-known articles of Langdell3 and Ames,4 by the oft-repeated observation of Maitland in his Lectures on Equity,5 by the very divergent treatment of Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence,6 by the still bolder thesis of Salmond in his volume on Jurisprudence,7 and by the discordant utterances of Mr Hart8 and Mr Whitlock9 in their very recent contribution to our periodical literature.
