ABSTRACT
The legal presumption that the right of a dominant firm to unilaterally choose or refuse its customers is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation is regarded as one of the most difficult topics in competition and antitrust policies. The difficulty with this notion is that if one of the fundamental tenets of competition policy is to ensure that firms compete to the benefit of consumers and the economy as a whole, then the law cannot on one hand cannot encourage such a position, and on the other request firms not to keep the rewards of innovation at the expense of their rivals. Furthermore, requiring firms to cooperate in supplying goods/services or sharing facilities for their supply would seem to amount to creating a platform for collusion to emerge. Thus, calls that cases of refusal to supply should always command a presumption of legality or be moved out into private contractual law might seem understandable. The difficulty with subscribing to this latter view is that contractual laws are in general not sufficient to catch instances where certain business practices, even if somewhat lawful, still possess the probability of distorting the structure of existing competition in a market.
