ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the Alvin Plantinga's epistemology, specifically his theory of knowledge. It discusses some of the questions crucial to understanding Plantinga's epistemology: particularly the internalism-externalism distinction and his 'no-defeater condition'. There have been a range of rationales offered for internalism. The three most prominent of these rationales are: the idea that epistemic justification should be understood deontologically, the notion that justification consists in having a reason in the form of another belief, and that externalist epistemologies either fail to appreciate the skeptical objection or fail to identify epistemic properties that are relevant or interesting. The chapter considers two general categories of objections to Plantinga's epistemology. The first is that Plantinga's 'proper function' requirement is not necessary for warrant. The second is that Plantinga's epistemology is too permissive and, consequently, that it is insufficient as an account of epistemic warrant. The chapter concludes with an analysis of a pair of common objections to Plantinga's epistemology.
