ABSTRACT
In so far as even the most abstract account of law aims to understand a human institution of vital importance, it is not unreasonable to consider legal philosophy to be a kind of applied philosophy. Legal philosophy can become applied legal philosophy in several ways. One route towards application is to focus on a particular legal system and offer philosophical insights and analyses with regard to that system in particular. Lawyers and judges are applied legal philosophers in this regard, for in furthering their own knowledge of their own legal system, they aim to improve their ability to win cases or offer convincing judicial decisions. Another path towards the application of legal philosophy, superior to the first from the perspective of the professional philosopher who aims to understand law in general rather than the law of a particular legal system, involves ensuring that philosophical reflection on the nature of law in general – that is, reflection on what is true of all legal systems – is coincident with the actual circumstances of law in all places and at all times. The first version of applied legal philosophy is particular jurisprudence; the latter is general philosophical jurisprudence. Each of these strategies has disadvantages: the fully particularized method of analysing single legal systems is unlikely, without further extension along much more general lines, to lead to knowledge about law in general, while the highly abstract, wholly general analysis of law is of limited use for understanding the current trend towards charter systems and charter rights. However, by focusing on constitutional adjudication in charter societies, we can further our knowledge of law in such a way as to apply it to actual legal systems while avoiding an undue particularism of limited scope. Accordingly, an applied legal theory with these aims should have as its primary referent the notion of law in general – the concept of law – though it must be carefully grounded in analyses of actual rather than merely hypothetical legal practices.
