ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Henrich's analysis of the epistemic self-relation. This is done partly in the context of his historical investigations of Fichte's intellectual development as it manifests itself in some of the versions of his Wissenschaftslehre and partly from a systematic point of view, including the changes in Henrich's own position over the years. The chapter compares Henrich's approach with the theory of the self recently developed by Galen Strawson within analytic philosophy and with Thomas Nagel's anti-reductionist analyses of the self within what is, in spite of Nagel's anti-reductionism, a version of naturalism. It discusses different systematic approaches, including some historical examples, to the epistemic problems of self-consciousness. The chapter contrasts Henrich's conception of subjectivity and his approach to its philosophical analysis with that of an analytic philosopher who has recently developed a theory of the self: Galen Strawson.
