Introduction

Introduction Coincidences This book is the product of a series of coincidences. Most things probably are, and the bulk of these coincidences are not all that interesting, but there are a couple that are worth mentioning, because of the role they play in establishing the philosophical point of this book. I wrote my PhD thesis at the University of Warwick on the philosophy of Donald Davidson. At the time there were some sixty PhD students in the department, but only a handful wrote on topics in analytic philosophy. Many of the conversations with my peers turned on the possibility or impossibility of uniting analytic and continental philosophy. But it was not until my ‘continental’ friends started commenting on my explicitly Davidsonian arguments in the pub by saying ‘this is not Davidson, it is Spinoza’ that I made the link between Davidson and Spinoza. But the connection was broader. Not only can Spinoza’s thought be used to forge a link with Davidson and the 20th century, but Spinoza’s thought is used by many continental and analytic philosophers as an inspiration, but also as a basis for further thought. In this manner the connection between Davidson and Spinoza is not merely interesting as a possibly fruitful comparison between a 17th century and a 20th century philosopher, but also as a philosophically contentful connection between analytic and continental philosophy. On further investigation it appears that Davidson and Spinoza are compatible in a much more detailed and philosophically interesting way than one might have expected, given the surprising lack of literature on the topic. They are so compatible in fact, that I suspected that the combination of the two thinkers might well help in the construction of a philosophical system that is stronger than any one of the systems by itself. Here then, are the two things this book aims to do: 1, combine the thought of Spinoza and Davidson in such a way that the result contributes in what I hope will be a significant way to a better philosophical system, and 2, show that continental and analytic philosophy usually deal with exactly the same problems, and that often there is no reason why the two ‘currents’ should not be in dialogue. This second point is not dealt with explicitly, but I hope that it is borne out by the philosophical content of the book. Intended Audience The book contains a fair number of interpretations and explanations of the philosophies of Davidson and Spinoza, but it cannot be said that it is intended to be

an introductory work. Many of the interpretations may be different from what is considered mainstream. Further, I presuppose at least a working knowledge of the philosophies of Davidson and Spinoza. In short, I deem the book to be accessible and of possible interest to upper level undergraduates, graduate students and professional philosophers. For those few who are interested but feel they may lack the background I would recommend reading Spinoza’s Ethics in conjunction with an introductory work such as Behind the Geometrical Method by Edwin Curley, and the most central essays by Davidson, that have very recently been collected in a volume called The Essential Davidson (Davidson, 2006). Things This Book Is Not It is not advisable to try and offer an exhaustive list of everything that a book is not, but there are several possible expectations that I would like to address up front. First, this book is not a historical work on Spinoza. That is, I do not pretend to offer an interpretation of Spinoza’s work that strives for perfection when it comes to historical accuracy. Instead, I take what would appear to be a reasonable interpretation of Spinoza’s work and use it. In this process I try not to accept interpretations of Spinoza that are inconsistent with my understanding of other parts of his work or that seem to be too extreme to be acceptable. I do not necessarily set out to explain Spinoza to the reader. At the same time, I do hope that my interpretations are acceptable to the true Spinoza scholars, who do aim to get Spinoza exactly right. Much the same should be said about my treatment of Davidson. But as I started out with the intention of defending and amending a largely Davidsonian philosophical system, it is to be expected that I stay closer to Davidson than I do to Spinoza. But the critics may well disagree. I argue in several places that Davidson ought to say something other than he actually says, and I then continue to use that ‘new’ version of his thought in my arguments. Further I do not want to claim that the work is in any way complete. This work aspires to offer the outlines of a philosophical system that leans heavily on both Davidson and Spinoza. It is a short book that treats only a few of the great many conundrums that remain in philosophy, and many will say that even of those few not all have been solved, and they are probably right. The Main Themes of the Book Perhaps it would have been simpler to try to write a book with only one theme, but the subject matter and ambitions of the book simply do not allow for that. Thus there are several themes. Some are more explicitly present than others, but all are present. This is what they are:

Anti-Dualism It should not come as a great surprise that any work dealing with the philosophies of Donald Davidson and Baruch Spinoza will be thoroughly anti-dualistic on pretty much all the major ontological issues. That is, they are both substance monists, but at the same time Davidson is a conceptual dualist and Spinoza is even a conceptual pluralist. Anti-dualism is a theme in the book not because I dwell for a very long time on the arguments surrounding Davidson’s and Spinoza’s rejection of substance dualism, but instead because many of the arguments I do spend time on are often designed to battle the remnants of the once all powerful dualism. Some examples of this are the dualism between an uninterpreted data and a conceptual scheme, the dualism between reality and our way of understanding it, and the dualism between reality or the world and the language that represents this world. These would now, grouped together in this manner, quite obviously look as three different descriptions of the same epistemological dualism. Oddly enough, they have not been understood to be the same or even detrimentally dualistic at all over the last few centuries. Naturalism and Perhaps a Hint of Anti-Scientism The second theme of the book must be naturalism. I do not have a great deal of confidence in a major research project that sets out to design a philosophy that is naturalistic. The reason for this lack of confidence in such a project is that I fear that it would lead too easily to the same mistake that many Medieval philosophers made: to steer too much towards the desirable, pre-established conclusion of the arguments and hence run the risk of forging the outcome. I do not think that a larger notion such as naturalism should rule out many other possible options in advance. That said, I do have a great deal of confidence in the kind of simple and compelling answers that naturalism provides in philosophy. More often than not it is the lack of a naturalistic view that explains why particular problems appear to be intractable. I think, for instance, of the mind body problem. Spinoza’s naturalism is dictated by the contents of his universe. There is only the one substance. If the world is to be understood at all, then all the answers must be found in that one substance, world, or nature. Although his naturalism is carried through with the utmost consistency, he is never persuaded to give in to a form of naturalism that curtails the nearly endless variety of answers that his ontology still allows. He refuses to rule out in advance any options that might be supported by his single substance universe. Davidson does give in to this temptation. The force and influence of natural science on philosophy has not faded in the 20th century. The pressure to stay ‘in line’ with natural science is high. Davidson does a splendid job of resisting this pressure when he says that he is not a physicalist (Davidson, 1995), especially when it comes to mental events, but I believe that he should also have resisted being a materialist too. Instead, I will suggest, he needs to be much more

naturalistic and not give in to any pre-established theoretical qualifications to substance. In addition to this I believe that if this philosophical system is thoroughly naturalistic, then it also deserves a naturalistic ethics. I shall attempt to provide the beginning of one. Ethical Objectivism It is probably not so surprising that if one advocates a naturalistic ethics, then this will almost inevitably lead to an objectivist ethics. And that is exactly what I propose. The answers to ethical questions can be found in substance, the world, or nature. And at this level of analysis the question is if there is room for anything but objectivity. Analytic and Continental: Bridging the Gap Perhaps it cannot properly be called a theme, but it is an important ingredient in the book: bridging, or rather ignoring the gap between continental and analytic philosophy. It is undeniable that the gap exists, but the nature of the gap appears, on investigation, to be entirely political. There does not seem to be a philosophical basis for the divide between these two ‘currents’ in philosophy. And yet this has been enough to divide all of Western philosophy in two camps. I want to argue that this divide does not contribute in any way to philosophy. Instead it impoverishes the discipline by systematically excluding ‘the other half’ of professional philosophers in every debate. I do not argue this in any detail in this book, but I believe that the best way to deal with a controversy such as this one is to practice what one preaches. Hence I make it a point to ignore the great divide in doing philosophy. System Building Finally there is one more item that is probably not quite deserving of the title ‘theme’, and that is the ambition of system building. As in the matter of analytic versus continental philosophy I do not speak of system building very much in this book, but it is still central to the kind of philosophy I attempt to construct. I am committed to the view that both Davidson and Spinoza are system building philosophers. All my interpretations and possible modifications of their respective philosophies will also reflect this system building attitude.