ABSTRACT
In the early 1990s, we witnessed an endless debate about the emergence of a 'new world order'. Even without President Bush's magic and vague words, an international discussion about the basic structure of the postCold War world was necessary and inevitable (see Mols 1993 for details). At the beginning of the decade a sort of end-of-history spirit proved to be prevalent, with Fukuyama's position as a shibboleth among the Western
powers and probably elsewhere (see Jensen 1990 for Fukuyama's 1989 article and comments). It was not the idea as such that was attractive, but a widespread feeling of relief because a cluster of totalitarian and authoritarian states and their claim of a world revolution seemed to be fading away. The huge Soviet Empire simply dissolved, and this offered hope that a new and lasting peace, based on people's consent, would prosper - world-wide on the basis of a consensual political order, shared values, free markets and large economic networks.
