ABSTRACT
The most unique phenomenon in U.S.-China relations in the 1990s was the reemergence of anti-American sentiment among the Chinese amidst drastic expansion and strengthening of economic and cultural ties between the two nations. The increasingly strong anti-American feelings were first revealed in public polls conducted by Chinese media in 1994, then articulated through a large number of popular books published in 1996, and culminated in mass demonstrations held in major cities after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. The rise of anti-American sentiment and activities in the 1990s marked not only a drastic shift of popular feelings toward the United States among the Chinese people, but also the resurrection of public opinion as a shaping force in the making of China’s foreign policy. While providing popular support for the Chinese government in its handling of crises in U.S-China relations, the surge of anti-American sentiment also put new restraints on policy makers in Beijing. Although Chinese as well as American leaders took steps to keep anti-American feelings in China under control, the resentment shared by Chinese people, especially young students and scholars, remained strong throughout the 1990s and lasted into the early years of the 21st century, posing a major threat to the development of strong and healthy bilateral relations. It is essential to have a comprehensive analysis and accurate assessment of the causes, nature, magnitude, and impact of recent anti-American sentiment in China in order to better understand the ups and downs in U.S.-China relations in the 1990s and build more constructive relations between the two nations in the new century. Although the rise of anti-American sentiment in China aroused great attention from Chinese as well as American journalists, diplomats, and scholars, most existing reports and studies on the subject lacked a deep historical or cultural perspective. Unlike their Chinese counterparts who were divided in their attitudes toward the recent anti-American sentiments and activities, the American journalists and scholars generally shared a similar view toward the subject. In their news reports and scholarly studies, most American writers quickly applied anti-
Americanism as a standard jargon to all unfriendly sentiments and activities in China and blamed their rise squarely on the Chinese government.1 As a loaded term generally accepted by American scholars as well as the general public, antiAmericanism refers to views and attitudes hostile to American government, people, culture, and value systems. According to Paul Hollander such an attitude “more often than not, is irrational and misdirected; it consists of attitudes and sentiments that reveal more about those displaying them than about the target of the hostile critiques.”2 Despite the convenience and popularity, neither the term of anti-Americanism nor the accusation of the Chinese government could accurately depict or completely explain the reemergence of anti-American sentiments in China in the 1990s. David L. Shambaugh sharply observed in the late 1980s that all anti-American movements in China during the Cold War were “orchestrated by the government to serve political purposes.”3 However, if it is applied to antiAmerican sentiment and activities in China in the 1990s, such a generalization, as Peter Hays Gries has recently pointed out, “greatly oversimplifies reality.”4 A more accurate assessment and a better understanding of China’s most recent anti-American sentiments could be most effectively achieved through adopting a broader historical, cultural, and international perspective. Based on close examination of social and cultural changes in China in the 1990s and careful comparison between the recent activities and all major anti-American movements in China’s modern history, I will argue that China had at least three different types of anti-American movements prior to the 1990s with different leaders, goals, and tactics. While fully recognizing the role of the Chinese government in antiAmerican activities, especially those in the 1950s and 1960s, I intend to show that the Chinese people did initiate and organize most of the anti-American movements prior to 1949 and after the Cold War. Since recent anti-American activities, those in the first half of the 20th century, were aimed sharply at American policy toward China rather than at American people, culture, system, products, they were not truly anti-American as popularly defined. Once it reemerged in the 1990s as an important part of the Chinese public opinion, anti-American sentiment began to play an increasingly significant role in the making and implementation of foreign policies, marking the beginning of an end to an era when Sino-American relations could be handled by a few top leaders behind closed doors.
