ABSTRACT
The preceding chapters have reviewed two prominent approaches in political philosophy. Among other things, the main objection to utilitarianism was that it is subjective, and does not intrinsically value the importance of individual freedom and rights. Equalizing people’s welfare – pleasure, happiness or preference-satisfaction – would turn out to be equalizing too much. Welfare differences such as expensive tastes and antisocial preferences ought to be treated as matters of individual responsibility and do not have a claim on justice. In the case of adaptive preferences, since a person’s subjective perceptions of well-being are malleable to circumstances, alluding to objective notions such as ‘functionings’, ‘urgency’, ‘exploitation’ and so on is helpful in discerning the essential components of well-being. In contrast to utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory is objective, since it aims at a fair distribution of primary good, with basic liberties and opportunities. A person’s benefits and standing in society, in Rawls’s theory, are judged not on the basis of utility, but rather in terms of the holding of primary goods. Nonetheless, from the perspective of people’s capability variations, even Rawls’s theory turns out to be inadequate in certain respects. Giving the same stock of primary goods to people with significant capability shortfalls as to anybody else would leave them rather disadvantaged. Capability deprivations can range from physical and learning disabilities to uneven distribution within the family to the lack of institutional arrangements for the dependent and for those who care for them. Equalizing the holding of primary goods in such instances might amount to equalizing too little. Capability variations which are not the responsibility of individuals, but nevertheless impede people from living valuable human lives should fall under the purview of justice.
