ABSTRACT
In 1918, artillery intelligence grew in importance as it became clear that surprise was critical for the prospects of a German offensive, and every GHQ intelligence summary included a section on German artillery activity.1 There was not enough German heavy artillery to mount two simultaneous attacks, and German intentions could be discerned by following the reinforcing artillery as it moved from place to place. In January 1918, when Charteris was removed as chief of Intelligence at GHQ, Birch seized the opportunity.2 He ordered the armies to report their intelligence to him-to the MGRA rather than Intelligence-and used his possession of the field to negotiate a better agreement with Herbert Lawrence, the new head of Intelligence. Later in the year, once the Germans lost the initiative, artillery intelligence played a role first in attrition of the German forces, then in selection of places for British offensives. For instance, the Fourth Army paid great attention to the number and types of German guns facing them at Amiens, checking for any hint that the Germans expected an attack.3 Perhaps Lawrence (who was soon promoted to be Haig’s chief of staff) realized what had happened, for Birch was never able to win the next stage of his campaign-to have artillery intelligence officers upgraded to GSO3s or even GSO2s.
